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ABSTRACT—New York Times v. Sullivan, arguably the Supreme Court’s
most significant First Amendment decision, marks its fiftieth anniversary
next year. Often overlooked in discussions of the case’s impact on the
freedom of speech and freedom of the press is that it arose from a complex
puzzle of constitutional, statutory, and judge-made jurisdictional and
procedural rules. These kept the case in hostile Alabama state courts for
four years and a half-million-dollar judgment before the Times and its civilrights-leader co-defendants finally could avail themselves of the structural
protections of federal court and Article III judges. The case’s outcome and
the particular First Amendment rules it established are a product of this
jurisdictional and procedural background.
Martin H. Redish has produced a lengthy record of influential and
cutting-edge scholarship on civil procedure, federal jurisdiction, and the
First Amendment, and has been a sharp and unforgiving critic of many of
the jurisdictional rules that kept the case out of federal court for so long. It
is appropriate to recognize Redish’s scholarly legacy by examining this
landmark case, which sits at the intersection of his three scholarly pursuits
and demonstrates why many of his arguments and criticisms are precisely
correct.
AUTHOR—Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. J.D., Northwestern
University School of Law, 1997. My thanks to Frederic Bloom and MaryRose Papandrea for their comments on this Essay. As a student at
Northwestern from 1994 to 1997, I took three classes with Marty Redish,
worked as his research assistant, and coauthored an article with him. My
thanks to James Pfander and the editors of the Northwestern University
Law Review for inviting me to participate in this celebration of Marty’s
career. And my special thanks to Marty for being a wonderful friend,
mentor, and inspiration.
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INTRODUCTION
New York Times v. Sullivan,1 arguably the Supreme Court’s most
significant First Amendment case,2 marks its fiftieth anniversary next year.
Sullivan took an area of law—state libel law—that had not previously been
recognized as subject to federal constitutional constraint and moved it
“from far out frozen darkness to the sunny warmth of the first
amendment.”3 The Court employed sweeping language about the
importance of the freedom of speech; about the liberty of citizens and the
press to criticize public officials in even the most caustic, vehement, and
occasionally erroneous terms; and about the fundamental idea that speech
on matters of public concern must be “uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.”4 It also resolved a 160-year-old historical debate by declaring that
seditious libel or anything like it is inconsistent with fundamental notions
of free expression.5 These ideas launched the modern First Amendment and
have informed free speech jurisprudence for half a century.6 No wonder the

1

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 193–94.
3
William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the Press—An
Extended Comment on “The Anderson Solution,” 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 793 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
4
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270–71.
5
Id. at 276; see also ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 65–66 (1991) (discussing history of Sedition Act); Christina E. Wells, Lies, Honor, and
the Government’s Good Name: Seditious Libel and the Stolen Valor Act, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 136,
138 (2012).
6
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Story of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in FIRST AMENDMENT
STORIES 229, 262 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012); see, e.g., United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011); McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415–16 (1989);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988).
2
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Court’s unanimous decision was celebrated as “an occasion for dancing in
the streets.”7
Underlying the state law defamation action in which the Court made
these pronouncements was a complex puzzle of federal jurisdiction and
civil procedure. The speaker-defendants were unable to obtain a federal
forum for their federal constitutional claims for four years, meaning they
endured two layers of overwhelming and costly defeat in state court before
finally getting to an Article III tribunal. Even then, they got to federal court
only because the Justices, exercising unchecked discretion and to the
surprise of many (including the lead media defendant), found the case
worth hearing. This circuitous and uncertain route to federal court was
dictated by jurisdictional and procedural rules—constitutional, statutory,
and judge made—in effect at the time and still in effect today. The speechprotective outcome in Sullivan and the doctrine it spawned are a product of
this jurisdictional and procedural background. At the same time, had things
gone slightly differently, the case might never have reached the Supreme
Court or any other federal forum, just as it remains conceivable that the
next Sullivan might never do so. The substantive First Amendment
consequences of that possibility are obvious and troubling.
This volume of the Northwestern University Law Review honors the
work of Martin H. Redish, who in forty years in the academy has produced
a record of influential and cutting-edge scholarship on civil procedure,
federal jurisdiction, and the First Amendment. This is the ideal forum to
consider the extent to which the First Amendment’s greatest judicial
victory was awash in procedure and federal jurisdiction. In fact, Redish has
been a sharp and unforgiving critic of many of the jurisdictional and
procedural doctrines at issue. Sullivan demonstrates why his arguments and
criticisms are precisely right.
I. PRELUDE TO A WATERSHED CASE
New York Times v. Sullivan arose from an editorial advertisement
published in the New York Times in March 1960, titled Heed Their Rising
Voices. The ad described alleged police misconduct in responding to civil
rights protests at Alabama State College in Montgomery; it sought
contributions for a fund to defend Martin Luther King, Jr. against state tax
perjury charges, as well as to support student protesters and the struggle for
voting rights. The ad included a list of celebrity civil rights supporters and
was signed by more than twenty leaders of the civil rights movement,
including four—Ralph Abernathy, Fred Shuttlesworth, Joseph E. Lowery,
and S.S. Seay, Sr.—who were citizens of Alabama.8
7

Kalven, supra note 2, at 221 n.125 (recalling the reaction of preeminent First Amendment scholar
Alexander Meiklejohn to the decision).
8
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–57; LEWIS, supra note 5, at 5–8; Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1960, at 25, reprinted in LEWIS, supra note 5, at 2–3.
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Five local and state officials filed separate defamation actions in
Alabama state court in response to the ad, seeking a total of $3 million.9
One of those suits was by L.B. Sullivan, a Montgomery city commissioner
whose duties included supervising the police department (although not
managing day-to-day operations); defendants were the Times and the four
Alabaman signatories on the ad. Sullivan was not named or described in the
ad, but he insisted that the ad’s description of police misconduct
necessarily implicated him as the department supervisor and leader.10
Moreover, although he did not suffer any actual harm to his reputation—
indeed, it is more likely his reputation was enhanced by a charge that he
was hostile to civil rights protesters and the civil rights movement11—he
sought $500,000 from the Times and the four Alabaman signatories.12
The defendants almost certainly would have preferred to litigate in
federal court rather than state court. The case was tried before Judge Walter
Burgwyn Jones, an avowed segregationist who some suspect actually
helped the plaintiffs devise their litigation strategy,13 and a jury of white
Southerners whose photographs appeared in the local newspaper.14
Unsurprisingly, the jury returned a verdict for Sullivan and awarded the full
$500,000, a decision affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court.15 Sullivan
immediately sought to collect on the judgment by attaching the
automobiles, real property, and financial accounts of Abernathy and the
other individual defendants.16
II. FEDERAL FORUM AT TRIAL: REMOVAL
All of this occurred in state court during the heart of the civil rights
movement, when a northern newspaper and four African-American civil
rights leaders might expect to face procedural and systemic disadvantages
in asserting their First Amendment liberties. The question is why the case
remained in state court for so long and how it ultimately reached federal
court.
Sullivan unsurprisingly chose to file suit in Alabama state court. The
first path into federal court thus would have been for the defendants to
9

LEWIS, supra note 5, at 12–14; Papandrea, supra note 6, at 237.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258; LEWIS, supra note 5, at 28–29; Papandrea, supra note 6, at 240–41.
11
Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 94 (calling it
“laughable” to believe that Sullivan’s reputation was injured).
12
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256; LEWIS, supra note 5, at 12; Papandrea, supra note 6, at 236–37.
13
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 25–26; Papandrea, supra note 6, at 238–39.
14
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 27.
15
Id. at 33, 44–45; Papandrea, supra note 6, at 242.
16
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 43–44. There is a procedural story to this, as well. All five defendants
moved for a new trial following the jury verdict, but the Times requested and was granted a one-month
continuance. Judge Jones ruled that because the four ministers had not also asked for a continuance,
they had waived their motions for a new trial. They thus were more immediately subject to enforcement
than the newspaper, even though the paper was obviously better able to satisfy a $500,000 judgment. Id.
10
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remove to federal district court. Removal accords defendants a limited right
to select a federal forum in the face of the plaintiff’s preference for state
court. An action is removable only if the case could have been filed in
federal district court in the first instance—that is, if the federal district court
would have had original subject matter jurisdiction.17
But a combination of jurisdictional and procedural rules made removal
to federal court impossible, so much so that the defendants made no effort
to remove or even to argue that a federal district court would have had
subject matter jurisdiction.18
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
The most obvious, and most discussed, basis for removal would have
been diversity of citizenship; a federal district court has original
jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states where the
amount in controversy exceeds some minimum amount.19 At bottom, this
action could have been seen as between citizens of different states—
Sullivan, the plaintiff, was from Alabama and the Times, the primary
defendant and the real moneyed target of the litigation, was from New
York (where the publishing company was incorporated and had its
principal place of business). And the suit sought $500,000, far in excess of
the jurisdictional minimum.
But Sullivan also sued those four civil rights leaders who had signed
the ad—the only four signatories who happened to be Alabama citizens. An
action is “between citizens of different states” only when there is “complete
diversity,” meaning no adverse parties are citizens of the same state.20
Minimal diversity—where at least one party is diverse from one adverse
party—is not sufficient. The demand for complete diversity is not
obviously compelled by constitutional text, statutory text, or diversity’s
underlying policies; nevertheless, Congress has accepted the requirement as
a part of the diversity statute for so long that it can be said to reflect
congressional intent.21 Although there was minimal diversity between the
Times and Sullivan, there was not complete diversity, given the presence of
the four Alabamans; it thus was clear the case was not removable on
diversity grounds. Indeed, it has always been beyond obvious that
Sullivan’s lawyers knew this and named those four signatories—and no
17

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
The Times did challenge personal jurisdiction over it in Alabama, arguing that the fewer than 400
copies of the paper sold there were not sufficient minimum contacts with the state, but the motion was
denied. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 25–26.
19
§ 1332(a)(1).
20
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing
the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The
Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1803 (1992).
21
Redish, supra note 20, at 1803–05.
18
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others—precisely to destroy complete diversity and keep the case in state
court.22
Diversity jurisdiction exists to counter bias against outsider litigants
facing favored local parties in state court, where judges are often elected or
subject to reelection, judges and juries are drawn locally, and everyone is
potentially subject to local popular pressures and passions.23 Federal courts,
with judges who enjoy life tenure and guaranteed salary, are insulated from
those local biases and political passions and thus better able to provide an
outsider with a fundamentally fair forum.24 The argument for requiring
complete, as opposed to minimal, diversity is that local bias concerns
disappear when minimal diversity is present; when there are nondiverse
adverse parties, any bias against the outsider party is mitigated by having
locals on both sides.25 In other words, the Times need not have worried
about suffering local bias in Alabama state court because it had four
Alabamans as co-parties whose presence would balance any local
favoritism for the Alabaman plaintiff.
Redish has criticized the logic behind the complete diversity
requirement, and Sullivan illustrates the point. This was a case in which the
goals of diversity could be served only by allowing the case into federal
court on minimal diversity. The presence of a nondiverse co-party does
little to stop a state court bent on prejudicing an outsider.26 At best,
nondiverse parties may neutralize favoritism towards the adverse local;
they do nothing to halt prejudice against the nonlocal party.27 That is, if the
four signatory defendants negated favoritism towards Sullivan, they did
nothing to stop the desire of the court, the jury, or the local public to “get”
the outsider Yankee newspaper that was stirring up trouble. In fact, a
Montgomery newspaper applauded the trial court’s judgment as
successfully “causing reckless publishers of the North . . . to make a resurvey of their habit of permitting anything detrimental to the South and its
people to appear in their columns.”28 From the local perspective, the Times
was the “big bad” in the case and the target of popular antipathy. The Times
22

LEWIS, supra note 5, at 13–14; Papandrea, supra note 6, at 236.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553–54 (2005); Redish, supra note
20, at 1800–01.
24
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Redish, supra note 20, at 1801.
25
Exxon, 545 U.S. at 554; Redish, supra note 20, at 1805 (discussing the argument in favor of
demanding complete diversity). At the time Sullivan filed his state court lawsuit, the Supreme Court
had not yet clarified whether complete diversity came from Article III or from the diversity statute, or
whether Congress ever could give federal courts jurisdiction on less-than-complete diversity. Not until
1967 did the Supreme Court establish, again without explanation, that complete diversity was a
statutory requirement, meaning Congress could grant jurisdiction on minimal diversity if it chose. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967); see Exxon, 545 U.S. at 553.
26
Redish, supra note 20, at 1805.
27
Id.
28
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 34 (alteration in original).
23
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needed the structural protections of a federal forum, a need that was not
alleviated by having Alabaman co-defendants.
The problem was exacerbated in Sullivan because the purportedly
local defendants were themselves functionally “outsiders.” AfricanAmericans were not truly part of the local community structure in racially
segregated 1960 Montgomery. This was even truer for civil rights leaders
who were urging fundamental change to Southern society. While they were
from Alabama, they were not of Alabama or the power structure that
influenced sociopolitical institutions such as the courts. They were unlikely
to benefit from local favoritism, especially before that judge and jury, or to
balance local favoritism towards Sullivan. Rather, they would have been
the target of a different kind of popular prejudice, such that the Times
arguably was worse off having them as co-defendants than it would have
been alone.
Finally, lack of jurisdiction was not the only barrier to diversity
removal; there was also a procedural hurdle. Under the forum-defendant
rule, a case is not removable on the basis of diversity, even if federal
jurisdiction is present, if any defendant is from the state in which litigation
is brought.29 This reflects the view that local defendants (and their nonlocal
co-parties) do not need a federal forum for protection from local bias.
Again, this seems highly dubious in a case where the local defendants are
African-American civil rights leaders sued alongside an outsider newspaper
in that time and place. The point is that even if federal jurisdiction could
exist on minimal diversity (as diversity’s underlying policies and purposes
might suggest), it would not have helped the defendants here. This further
explains Sullivan’s strategic decision to sue the four Alabamans along with
the Times.
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction
At the time Sullivan filed his lawsuit, it had not been established, and
no one believed, that an ordinary state law defamation action implicated the
First Amendment. The parties’ trial arguments focused largely on state law
issues—falsity, absence of harm to Sullivan (or even any mention of him in
the publication), and, for the ministers, whether they were involved with, or
even knew about, creating the ad.30 The Times did raise freedom of the
press as a defense in both the state trial court and the Alabama Supreme
Court, but the argument was quickly swept aside.31 Constitutional limits on
civil defamation became the focal point only when Herbert Wechsler began
working to get the case to the Supreme Court of the United States. Even
then, Wechsler had to convince Times executives that First Amendment

29
30
31

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2006).
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 28–32.
Id. at 43–45.
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doctrine had evolved in a sufficiently speech-protective direction by the
early 1960s that these arguments were worth pursuing.32
If state defamation law has been somewhat constitutionalized, a
second basis for removal emerges. Federal district courts have original
jurisdiction over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.”33 Perhaps the presence of substantial First
Amendment issues made Sullivan’s defamation action one arising under
the Constitution.
This argument fails, however, because of the “well-pleaded
complaint” rule. This longstanding judicially created rule provides that a
civil action arises under federal law only if the federal issue enters the case
as part of the claim stated in the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint; it is not
enough that a federal issue arises as an anticipated part of any defenses or
responses to the claim or that a federal issue is expected to arise later in the
case.34 As a result, even though Sullivan ultimately would be resolved
entirely on construction and application of First Amendment principles,
those constitutional issues appeared as a defensive response to the original
state law claim. The case did not “arise under” federal law, placing it
beyond the original jurisdiction of the federal district court and not subject
to removal.
Redish argues that the well-pleaded complaint rule makes no sense,
especially where it is obvious from the outset of a case that issues of
federal law unquestionably will arise35 and likely will determine the
outcome of the case.36 Federal question jurisdiction famously exists to
ensure a judicial forum with the necessary expertise, respect, and solicitude
for federal law, rights, and interests. Federal judges, again armed with
Article III structural protections and with a federal institutional orientation,
will better identify the appropriate level of enforcement of federal law and
rights than state judges who lack those protections and who are more
oriented to the local community.37 If the purpose of general federal question
jurisdiction is to provide an original judicial forum that will vigorously and
32

Id. at 106–07.
§ 1331.
34
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley,
211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 106 (2d ed. 1990); Redish, supra note 20, at 1794–95.
35
REDISH, supra note 34, at 106–07; Redish, supra note 20, at 1796.
36
REDISH, supra note 34, at 105, 108; see also Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s
Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 656 (1987) (“It is appropriate to require the party seeking federal
jurisdiction to demonstrate the existence of a dispute based upon federal law that can, if adjudicated,
determine the outcome of the case.”).
37
See REDISH, supra note 34, at 83, 153, 346; Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1264 (2011); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1119–20, 1124–25 (1977); Redish, supra note 20, at 1825–26.
33
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competently respect and enforce federal rights, the procedural posture in
which the federal issue presents does not matter; these underlying policies
are implicated as much when the federal issue arises in a defense or
response to a claim as when it arises in the original claim itself. At the very
least, Redish argues, no one has persuasively explained why other policies
supporting the well-pleaded complaint rule (primarily related to docket
control and limiting caseloads in federal trial courts by excluding claims
involving only potential federal defenses) trump the value of having all
federal issues resolved in federal court by federal judges.38
Federal judicial respect and solicitude for federal law would have been
particularly salient in Sullivan. The trial occurred at the height of the civil
rights movement, during the period of “massive resistance” to Brown v.
Board of Education and counterattacks against efforts to undo Southern
apartheid.39 Judge Jones, himself an ardent segregationist, had already
made rulings in several other cases thwarting the civil rights movement, the
reach of federal law, and federal efforts to protect civil rights.40
Indeed, Sullivan’s decision to sue for defamation was not an isolated
move. Government officials throughout the South had devised a plan to
utilize civil libel litigation specifically as a tool for silencing the civil rights
movement and the national press that, in covering the movement, revealed
to the nation the face of a racist society.41 And the strategy was working.
The Times policy long had been to refuse to settle defamation actions, insist
that it published the truth, and risk the occasional adverse judgment in the
event of error as “one of the vicissitudes of life.”42 By the early 1960s,
however, the pile of potential Southern libel judgments approached
$300 million and rendered that legal strategy unworkable.43 The First
Amendment implications of all this were obvious. State defamation
lawsuits and crippling state civil judgments had become an official weapon
for silencing criticism of government, the functional equivalent of seditious
libel prosecutions.
The Times needed a federal forum to defend its First Amendment
rights against this wave of lawsuits. There is, of course, always a strong
reluctance to appear to insult state courts and state judges or to distrust their
ability or willingness to understand and apply the First Amendment.44 But
Sullivan reveals that sometimes insults and distrust are (or at least once

38

REDISH, supra note 34, at 106–07, 108; Redish, supra note 20, at 1796–97.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 330–34 (2004); LEWIS, supra note 5, at 19–22.
40
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 26.
41
Id. at 35–36.
42
Id. at 107.
43
Papandrea, supra note 6, at 237–38.
44
Neuborne, supra note 37, at 1119; Redish, supra note 20, at 1827–28.
39
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were) warranted.45 Judge Jones began the case by insisting it would be tried
under the laws of the State of Alabama and not the Fourteenth
Amendment.46 It is impossible to imagine him or a Southern jury accepting
constitutional arguments for a broad liberty to criticize segregationist
public officials. The freedom of speech could not survive if state judges
and juries of that era had had the final word on the liberty of protesters,
activists, and the press to criticize government officials, government policy,
and the South’s fundamental sociopolitical system.
Fred Bloom has suggested one other way the defendants might have
established federal question jurisdiction. At the time of the Sullivan trial, a
state law claim could arise under federal law when the claim depended on
construction or application of some underlying issue of federal law.47 The
well-pleaded complaint rule remains in play; the difference is that the
federal constitutional issue is not a defense responding to the state claim,
but is an embedded part of the claim itself.48
The structure of defamation law after Sullivan perhaps supports
Bloom’s argument. The First Amendment functions less as an affirmative
defense to a defamation claim (an external federal rule depriving the state
claim rule of its ordinary effect) than as a constitutionally dictated internal
limit on the elements of defamation. The First Amendment imposes federal
requirements on what a plaintiff must prove to prevail on his state libel
claim. State defamation law, and a civil judgment under that law, is
constitutionally valid only if it requires the plaintiff to prove falsehood,
actual malice, and that the claim was “of and concerning” the defendant, all
by clear and convincing evidence.49 The First Amendment thus was not
responding to Sullivan’s defamation claim, but redefining the state tort
itself. Perhaps a state cause of action, substantially modified by federal
constitutional elements, does arise under federal law for removal purposes.
The argument runs aground on the Court’s emphasis on federal docket
control as part of the arising-under analysis. The Court’s recent statements

45
Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449,
451–52 (1985) (discussing the “pathology” of Southern counterattacks on civil rights); Neuborne, supra
note 37, at 1119 & n.55 (discussing the unique breakdown of state judicial enforcement of federal rights
during the civil rights movement).
46
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 26.
47
See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S 109, 112 (1936); Smith v. Kan. City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 191 (1921); Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV.
971, 1028 (2009). The most recent statement provides that a claim arises under federal law where “a
state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a
federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
314 (2005); see also Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (describing Grable as
“condens[ing]” prior cases as a way “to bring some order to this unruly doctrine”).
48
Bloom, supra note 47.
49
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283–84, 289–91 (1964).
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establish that a case with an embedded substantial federal issue still does
not arise under federal law if it will bring a significant number of similar
cases into federal court in a way contrary to a sound division of labor
between federal and state courts.50 If Sullivan’s lawsuit arose under the
First Amendment, so does every defamation action involving public
officials, public figures, and speech on matters of public concern; moving
that entire class of cases into federal court on federal question jurisdiction
certainly would “materially affect . . . the normal currents of litigation.”51
The Times thus was (and still would be, under the new condensed analysis)
unlikely to succeed on this federal question argument. But raising it would
have at least presented another jurisdictional puzzle for the Court to solve
before tackling the First Amendment merits.52
III. FEDERAL FORUM ON APPEAL
One could question the practical significance of the foregoing
discussion of original jurisdiction (or lack thereof) in federal district court
because the state courts and juries did not have the final word. The
Supreme Court of the United States has appellate jurisdiction to review
final judgments of the highest state court where, among other things, “any
title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution.”53 And it exercised that appellate jurisdiction in Sullivan.
There is a jurisdictional and procedural component to this as well.
“Arising under” means something different in Article III’s jurisdictional
parameters than in the congressional grant of original jurisdiction to the
district courts.54 The former has been given a broader scope, permitting
Congress to vest jurisdiction somewhere in the federal judiciary in any case
in which a federal issue does or could arise and form an ingredient of the
action.55 Congress granted this broader authority to the Supreme Court in
its appellate jurisdiction, allowing it to review all cases from state courts
implicating federal constitutional rights, even where, as in Sullivan, the
federal issue appears as a defense or response to the claim and not as part
of the original claim. By the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, it is

50

Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 313, 319.
Id. at 319; see also Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068 (rejecting the argument that Congress intended to
move legal malpractice issues into federal court because of an underlying patent issue in the case).
52
See Bloom, supra note 47 (arguing that if pushed, the Court could have reworked subject matter
jurisdiction in Sullivan).
53
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006).
54
REDISH, supra note 34, at 83–84. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution . . . .”), with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdictional of all civil actions arising under the Constitution . . . of the
United States.”).
55
REDISH, supra note 34, at 84–85; see Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823
(1824).
51
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clear that federal issues are present in the case and that the case is
appropriate for a federal forum.
Thus, although unable to go to federal district court earlier, the Times
and the four civil rights leaders got their federal forum when the Supreme
Court of the United States reviewed, and soundly reversed, the Alabama
Supreme Court’s affirmance of the state trial judgment. Perhaps, then, it is
not important that the defendants were unable to remove to federal district
court. They did ultimately present their case to an Article III court, and they
did ultimately prevail when federal judicial expertise, respect, and
solicitude for First Amendment liberties produced a new, highly speechprotective vision of the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press.
Two points run against this argument.
First, there was no guarantee that the Supreme Court would hear the
case. At the time of Sullivan, the Court had appellate (mandatory)
jurisdiction over some final state court decisions, but the rest of its
jurisdiction, including what brought Sullivan within its appellate authority
as a case asserting a federal right, privilege, or immunity, was by certiorari
(meaning the Court had unchecked discretion whether to hear the case).56
And as amended in 1988, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court
decisions is now entirely discretionary.57 The Court thus heard Sullivan
only because the Justices wanted to hear it.
Moreover, the Times may have gotten to the Supreme Court only
because the case was so unique. It fit the Court’s larger jurisprudential
project of expanding First Amendment liberties in disputes over race and
civil rights during an especially volatile period.58 It involved an especially
unsympathetic plaintiff, highly dubious harm, and a largely innocuous
publication that did not reasonably warrant a half-million-dollar
judgment.59 Yet the Court might have been less willing to take a case
lacking the same historical or factual context but similarly implicating
important First Amendment interests. In fact, the Court has a somewhat
spotty recent record in how it exercises its discretion to review speechrestrictive First Amendment rulings from state court.60
56

28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (amended 1988).
§ 1257 (1988).
58
Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 79;
see also Blasi, supra note 45, at 482 (citing Sullivan as an example of the Supreme Court establishing
speech-protective First Amendment rules in response to state efforts to repress the civil rights
movement).
59
Papandrea, supra note 6, at 263; Schauer, supra note 11.
60
Cf. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005) (declining to consider the propriety of a permanent
injunction as a defamation remedy following plaintiff’s death during the pendency of the case, although
vacating the state-court injunction); id. at 739 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the writ of
certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted, leaving the injunction in place); Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing the writ as improvidently granted in a state
unfair competition claim that misread the line between commercial and noncommercial corporate
57
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Second, appellate review in the Supreme Court, and thus a party’s
ability to vindicate constitutional liberties, depends on the posture of a case
and what happened in the lower courts. It may be harder for a reviewing
court to reverse a restrictive constitutional judgment when the lower court
has engaged in fact-finding to which the reviewing court must defer. Factfinding remains an important part of what federal judges do and an
important justification for providing federal forums for federal claims.61
Restricting federal fact-finding by keeping cases out of federal district
court and providing a federal forum only at the final stage thus might deny
parties the full benefits of federal judicial review.
This explains an oft-overlooked but vital procedural aspect of
Sullivan: independent appellate review of constitutional facts such as
falsehood, actual malice, and “of and concerning.”62 This mitigates some
negative procedural effects of jurisdictional limitations delaying the federal
forum until the court of last resort. The Supreme Court on review is not
bound by, or even deferential to, the state courts’ factual conclusions. Even
at this final stage of litigation, speakers receive complete de novo federal
judicial review of both legal and factual issues on which First Amendment
liberties depend.
In fact, Sullivan carried this procedure to the extreme. The Supreme
Court determined conclusively that there was not clear and convincing
evidence either of actual malice or that the statements in the ad were “of
and concerning” Sullivan, meaning the plaintiff could not prevail on his
defamation claims.63 Although it remanded the case, the Court conducted
all necessary fact-finding itself and left the state trial court nothing to do on
remand but enter judgment for the defendants.64
CONCLUSION
New York Times v. Sullivan is the cornerstone of modern First
Amendment jurisprudence. It also is, albeit silently and unwittingly, an
expression); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999) (affirming a broad state
court injunction barring a business manager from ever using racial epithets or derogatory words), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1138 (2000).
61
See William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise “Directly” Under
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 892–93 (1967); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the
District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 170 (1953).
62
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984) (applying independent appellate review to all
determinations of actual malice, whether by judge or jury); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public
Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 271–73 (1987)
(“[T]he Court’s independent review extended beyond the actual malice issue, suggesting that factfinding on traditional elements of common-law libel . . . may be subject to review for constitutional
sufficiency.”).
63
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–88.
64
Thanks to Fred Bloom for emphasizing this point.
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exemplar of modern federal jurisdiction and civil procedure doctrine and,
perhaps, defects in that doctrine. The case demonstrates the interaction
between substance and procedure and how problems in the latter affect the
development of the former.
It is, in other words, a case made for a scholar such as Marty Redish.

914

